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I N ITS FIRST FIVE YEARS as a Canadian province, Newfoundland embarked on a 
spectacular course of government-subsidized rapid economic development 
which led to the establishment of some 20 new secondary industries, 16 of them 
built by firms or businessmen from Germany. Five of these "German" indus-
tries failed within five years for a variety of reasons. Five of them survive today, 
although under different ownership.1 Compared with the experience of secon-
dary industries in the Maritimes or in Newfoundland's earlier history, the over-
all record of these industries does not appear particularly unfavorable. At least 
ten of the industries from Germany and their spinoffs contributed notably to the 
rapidly changing economy and the modernization of life in post-Confederation 
Newfoundland. Moreover, the international publicity surrounding the recruit-
ment of these industries put Newfoundland on the map for foreign investors and 
helped make subsequent resource development, such as the Churchill Falls 
hydro-power project, possible.2 Today, the existence of successful cement and 
The research for this study was facilitated with financial assistance provided by Multiculturalism 
Canada. Among the persons interviewed and consulted I am particularly indebted to Dr. Bobbie 
Robertson, former Canadian Trade Commissioner for Newfoundland, who has generously shared 
her wealth of information with me. Without the help of Nancy Grenville of Memorial University of 
Newfoundland's Centre for Newfoundland Studies, who enabled me to examine its collection of 
Joseph R. Smallwood's personal papers before these had been properly ordered and indexed, this 
study could not have been undertaken. Most of my references to documents from this collection are 
according to the original order in which the Smallwood papers were received (file titles and box 
numbers), which has since been changed by the Centre. The credit for translations from Latvian-
language sources belongs to Amis Lucis, St. John's. All translations from the numerous German-
language sources are my own unless indicated otherwise. The identity of some of the interviewees is 
confidential due to the sensitivity of certain issues. 
1 The 16 industries, including one from Austria and three initially managed by Latvians who had 
fled to Germany in 1945, were in the following sectors of production: cement, gypsum products, 
machinery and construction, cotton products, shoes, films and electronics, general construction, 
textiles, knitwear, chipboard, leather goods, leather tanning, leather garments, batteries, rubber 
products, gloves. The latter five folded within five years while the first five still exist today. 
2 Philip Smith, Brinco: The story of Churchill Falls (Toronto, 1975), pp. 15 ff. relates that in 
September 1952 a decisive breakthrough in negotiations with the Rothschilds in London was 
achieved only when Smallwood threatened he would be "off to Germany right away to offer his 
concession to companies there...no doubt he would get a better reception there than he had in 
London". 
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gypsum industries in the province enables the present government of New-
foundland to base its offshore strategy on the construction of concrete plat-
forms.3 
Yet Premier Joseph R. Smallwood's "new industries" programme, or what-
ever little is known about it,4 has become as controversial as the slogan "develop 
or perish", by which it is remembered. Originated by the Leader of the Opposi-
tion in July 1949 as a taunt, the words were eagerly appropriated by Smallwood 
as a banner for his new strategy of economic development.5 Posterity's attention 
has become riveted on those of the new industries that failed conspicuously, and 
the "new industries" of the early 1950s have become a favorite whipping boy for 
Newfoundland's growing rate of unemployment, indebtedness, economic stag-
nation and dependency.6 This negative image is the result not only of Small-
wood's inability to fulfill his exaggerated promises of rapid industrialization that 
was to change radically Newfoundland's fortunes within Confederation, but also 
of the trial of Latvian-born Alfred A. Valdmanis, who from May 1950 to Feb-
ruary 1953 was Smallwood's director of economic development. Valdmanis' 
conviction in September 1954 on a charge of having defrauded the Newfound-
land government of kickbacks extorted from a German firm triggered specula-
tions about the complicity of the managers of Newfoundland's "German" in-
dustries.7 It gave rise to never-ending questions about Smallwood's tactics of in-
dustrial development, his reliance on outside experts, his fiscal policies, his sys-
tem of patronage and ultimately about the very wisdom of establishing secon-
dary industries in Newfoundland.8 Today, it is assumed that Smallwood's deci-
sion in 1949-1950 to launch new industries was an unnecessary and avoidable 
gamble and that he rejected other options. It is also assumed that the Germans' 
and Latvians' reason for coming was to exploit Newfoundland by demanding 
3 Premier Brian Peckford in "Crosstalk on Radio Noon", CBC St. John's, 12 February 1985, 
explained that he preferred concrete over steel platforms because Newfoundland already had a 
cement industry and didn't have a steel industry, and concrete platforms would thus provide 
many more jobs. 
4 So far, the new industries programme has been reviewed in some detail only by Richard Gwyn, 
Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary (Toronto, 1972). His judgement, summed up on p. 168, 
is the prevailing view today: "Had Smallwood literally taken $10-15 million and burnt it in a 
bonfire atop Signal Hill, the end result, in terms of Newfoundland's progress, would not have 
been greatly different". According to Smallwood (in a letter to E.A. Leja, 20 November 1968, 
Personal Papers of E.A. Leja, in private possession) Gwyn's book "contains over two hundred 
inaccuracies, mis-statements and/or misquotes". 
5 Proceedings of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, 20 and 28 July 1949. 
6 See Ralph Matthews, "The Smallwood Legacy: The Development of Underdevelopment in 
Newfoundland, 1949-1972", Journal of Canadian Studies XIII, 4 (1978-79), pp. 89-108, and 
Brian Peckford, The Past in the Present (St. John's, 1983). 
7 Gwyn, Smallwood, Chapters 14 and 15. 
8 See Herbert F. Pottle, Dawn Without Light: Politics, Power and the People in the Smallwood 
Era (St. John's, 1979), and David G. Alexander, "Development and Dependence in Newfound-
land, 1880-1970", Acadiensis, IV, 1 (Autumn 1974), pp. 3-31. 
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subsidies and by importing antiquated equipment and "no dollars".9 The valid-
ity of this harsh verdict needs to be reexamined in the light of the available 
primary evidence which allows an analysis of the background to the recruitment 
of industries from Germany and the circumstances under which they were 
introduced. 
Few would deny that Newfoundlanders opted for Canada in 1948, not because 
they liked Canada or Canadians, but because Smallwood had managed to con-
vince them that Canada stood for a much higher standard of living than the 
economic and social order of pre-Confederation Newfoundland could ever 
provide. In the populist vein of William Coaker, Smallwood articulated this 
desire of the forgotten people from the outports, the "toiling masses", as he 
called them. In the rhetoric of his political symbolism the stark contrast between 
the promise of vast material progress under Confederation and the dire pros-
pects under the traditional order of the dominant fishocracy were two sides of 
the same coin.10 
In his campaign for Confederation, Smallwood advertised the advantages of 
union primarily as the extension of the material benefits of the Canadian welfare 
state, as well as the lowering of the cost of living resulting from the abolition of 
Newfoundland's high protective tariff. But he also envisaged the likelihood of a 
self-sustaining prosperity based on the systematic exploitation of Newfound-
land's undeveloped natural resources and the processing of these in Newfound-
land. As early as February 1947, Smallwood criticized the Newfoundland In-
dustrial Development Board, an agency of the local business community, for not 
encouraging the production of Portland cement when all the ingredients for it 
were available on the island." Furthermore, he refused to view the local 
possibilities of manufacturing birch, limestone and sawdust products and of 
processing seal skins, seaweed, fish offal, and wool from sheep, for instance, 
merely from the vantage point of Newfoundland's self-sufficiency. "We must 
export or die", was Smallwood's message to the National Convention on 10 
February 1947. "We must export our fish, our paper and our minerals. What-
ever lies in our power we must do to help industries bringing money into this 
country".12 
The roots of Smallwood's conviction that Newfoundland's salvation lay in in-
dustrial development can be traced to the beginnings of his political career. The 
outside observer of Newfoundland's economic and social history is struck by the 
lack of faith that the island's political leaders, in contrast to those of Iceland and 
Norway, have persistently displayed in the fishery as the obvious economic base. 
9 Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 149 ff. and Pottle, Dawn Without Light, p. 105. 
10 See Robert Paine, "The Persuasiveness of Smallwood: Rhetoric of Cuff er and Scoff of 
Metonym and Metaphor", Newfoundland Studies, I, 1 (Spring 1985), pp. 57-75. 
11 "Proceedings of the Ninth Sitting of the Second Session of the National Convention, Friday, 
February 7, 1947", p. 3, Centre for Newfoundland Studies [CNS]. 
12 "Proceedings of the Tenth Sitting of the Second Session of the National Convention, Monday, 
February 10, 1947", pp. 2-6, 13, 16 ff., and "Report of Local Industries Committee", CNS. 
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Smallwood inherited this traditional yearning for land-based industrial develop-
ment. Starting his political career as a newspaper reporter with socialist lean-
ings, a union organizer and an ardent admirer of Prime Minister Sir Richard 
Squires, he stated his convictions as early as 1931 in his book The New New-
foundland. Hailing Squires' successful efforts to establish a second pulp and 
paper mill in Corner Brook, he regretted that the resulting industrial boom had 
not begun half a century earlier. Declining overseas markets made fishing 
increasingly unprofitable, he argued, and industrialization was the only altern-
ative to depopulation, poverty and bankruptcy. By 1946, Smallwood had be-
come convinced that only union with Canada would realize this dream of a 
"New Newfoundland".13 
No evidence can be found to support a widespread local belief that Small-
wood ever advised the fishermen to "burn their boats".14 However, he left little 
doubt that any improvement of the fishery could result only from a general land-
based economic development. As Smallwood stated in 1953, "The day is gone in 
Newfoundland when the only way to help the fisheries is to help the fisheries, 
that day is gone". And his Minister of Fisheries had spelled out the reasons for 
this in April 1952: "It will take millions to do what must be done in the fishing 
industry, and it will take many millions more to raise our standard in other 
directions. Where are these millions to come from?"15 
Smallwood and his predecessors are often criticized for their preferences of 
economic development. Few have tried to inquire into the reasons why a 
strategy that seemed to build "on Newfoundland's weaknesses not her 
strengths"16 received such wide acceptance. The undoubtedly formidable polit-
ical, economic and social obstacles to a reform of the fishery provide only part 
of the answer. The more important half of the answer seems to lie in the realm of 
social psychology. To the extent that Newfoundlanders began to identify as 
North Americans, turned away from Europe and aspired to North American 
standards of living, they began to perceive the unreliable fishery as innately 
backward and as the cause of their deprivations and poverty. The advent of Con-
federation witnessed a large-scale, essentially short-distance, migration in 
search of better living conditions in larger urban centres. The movement 
appeared to be spontaneous and "without any directing force". According to 
The Evening Telegram, Newfoundlanders were abandoning hundreds of small 
secluded settlements, apparently not primarily to seek work, but rather for such 
amenities as "schools, roads, electric lights, water and sewer facilities, and for 
social life and entertainment". By June 1953, it was estimated that Newfound-
land's 1,300 settlements had been reduced to 1,000 and hundreds more were 
13 J.R. Smallwood, The New Newfoundland (New York, 1931), p. 8 ff., and I Chose Canada: The 
Memoirs of the Honourable Joseph R. "Joey" Smallwood (Toronto, 1973), pp. 235 ff. 
14 F.W. Rowe, The Smallwood Era (Toronto, 1985), pp. 41 ff. 
15 Assembly Proceedings, 9 March 1953, 8 April 1952. 
16 Rosemary E. Ommer, "What's Wrong With Canadian Fish?", Journal of Canadian Studies, 
XX, 3 (Autumn 1985), p. 130. 
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about to be deserted. At the same time it was noted with alarm that "the tradi-
tionally frugal Newfoundlander was learning spendthrift habits, and becoming 
accustomed to living on credit. Not only cars, but washing machines and every 
imaginable household appliance was being bought on long-term loans".17 It was 
obvious that Newfoundland's union with Canada had triggered a social, cultural 
and psychological revolution of unparalleled dimensions in the island's history. 
Since "the levels and patterns of North American consumption were the goal", 
David Alexander has suggested, "it is not surprising that development strategies 
to achieve it were imported as well".18 
Smallwood was acutely aware of the fact that, once the fringe benefits of Con-
federation began to raise the standard of living in Newfoundland, an increasing 
number of fishermen would abandon the fishery. They would do so not only 
because fishing was unprofitable but also because the aspirations to a North 
American way of life appeared irreconcilable with a life centred around outport 
fishing. As Smallwood stated in 1954: 
No matter how modern you make that fishery, no matter how attractive 
you make it for the people to live in such a settlement, what chance has the 
fishery there? I say the problem is largely a problem of people, their likes 
and dislikes...the standard of living they demand to have now is not the 
standard of living that seemed somehow to leave them fairly contented, 
fairly happy, thirty years ago.19 
Smallwood and his colleagues worried what the young fishermen would do if the 
teenage girls decided to leave the outports and went off to St. John's or Toronto. 
They were haunted by the spectre of Newfoundland as a "collection of old 
people waiting for old age pension cheques to come from Ottawa".20 In the 
1940s a realization of the backwardness of Newfoundland was driven home to 
residents of the island as never before by contact with the wartime American 
bases and a growing number of friends and relatives abroad, by wartime service 
in the Allied forces and through the media and motion pictures. "As the social 
and economic standards of North Americans were improving drastically", con-
cluded a comprehensive survey of Newfoundland's prospects by R.A. MacKay 
in 1946, "the people of Newfoundland...expect that their needs will receive full 
recognition".21 
From hindsight it appears that for a number of reasons "never in Newfound-
17 Evening Telegram (St. John's), 5 May, 14 June 1953. 
18 David Alexander, "Newfoundland's Traditional Economy and Development to 1934", 
Acadiensis, V, 2 (Spring 1976), p. 76. 
19 Assembly Proceedings, 10 May 1954. 
20 Smallwood, I Chose Canada, pp. 255 ff. 
21 R.A. MacKay, ed., Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (Toronto, 
1946), p. 338. 
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land's history was there such an opportunity for new departures as in 1949".22 
But a closer picture reveals that the course of the new provincial government 
was determined as much by the challenges of a severe economic crisis that hit 
Newfoundland in the first year of Confederation as by the opening up of new 
opportunities. The severity of the crisis was due to the coincidence of several un-
related developments. The competition from Canadian goods and services had a 
disastrous impact on hitherto protected local industries. The repercussions of 
the British currency crisis in the fall of 1949 were severe. And there were sub-
stantial layoffs at the American bases and acute problems with the fisheries. 
The year 1948 had already been rated by The Newfoundland Journal of Com-
merce as "one of the most difficult from a business standpoint, since the dark 
days of the depression".23 Confederation terms were hardly signed when, as The 
Daily News put it, "the industries of the Maritimes descended on Newfoundland 
like a swarm of locusts in search of business". The rapidly spreading practice of 
mail-ordering caused particular apprehensions among the political opposition, 
who predicted massive unemployment and depopulation due to the closure of 
local stores and factories, unless the government intervened.24 During 1949, in-
dustrial activity in Newfoundland dropped to its lowest level in ten years. By the 
end of November 1949, five of Newfoundland's 37 secondary industries were re-
ported to have shut down and three others to be "on their last legs".25 In order to 
survive, local industries were forced to expend large sums on modernizing their 
equipment to meet the new competition, and thus had to curtail operations and 
often freeze the wages of their remaining employees.26 The president of the New-
foundland Industrial Development Board warned in his annual address of De-
cember 1949 that the outlook was "full of disquietude" and local industries 
needed the support of the buying public and sympathetic treatment by the gov-
ernment.27 A programme of assistance announced by the federal government in 
September 1949, offering a premium of 15 per cent applicable to tenders for 
federal orders coming from Newfoundland, was of no help to industries which in 
their nature and scale of production were geared to local needs. Ironically, local 
products available in abundance, such as seal and whale oils, remained unsold, 
because Canadian manufacturers preferred to get their oils from the United 
22 Peter Neary and S.J.R. Noel, "Continuity and Change in Newfoundland Politics", in Peter 
Neary, ed., The Political Economy of Newfoundland, 1929-1972 (Toronto, 1973), p. 218. No 
evidence could be found in the personal papers of the Smallwood Collection at the CNS that in 
1949 Smallwood was influenced or inspired by or even aware of, the economic 
development schemes drawn up by the Commission of Government in 1944, and discussed by 
Peter Neary, "Great Britain and the Future of Newfoundland, 1939-45", Newfoundland Studies, 
I, 1 (Spring 1985), p. 46. 
23 Newfoundland Journal of Commerce (St. John's), XVI, 2 (February 1949), p. 28. 
24 Daily News, 17 May 1950, Evening Telegram, 6 December 1949. 
25 Evening Telegram, 26 November 1949. 
26 Evening Telegram, 14 June 1950. 
27 H.J. Russell and L.J. Harnum, eds., The Newfoundland Industrial Development Board and Its 
Work (St. John's, 1950), p. 141. 
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States and the Canadian government agreed to allocate a large sum of American 
dollars from Canada's restricted supply for this purpose.28 Adjustment of local 
industries to Confederation appears to have been slow and painful. A survey by 
The Newfoundland Journal of Commerce revealed that as late as August 1955 
many of Newfoundland's industries were on the road to recovery, "others are 
barely alive, and still others are in danger of dying".29 With 4,000 Newfound-
landers employed directly and 30,000 people benefitting indirectly from local in-
dustries in 1949,30 Smallwood had every reason to worry. 
The spectre of unemployment on a scale reminiscent of the 1930s had been 
looming ever since the devaluation of the British pound in mid-September 1949 
which had the effect of raising the prices of Newfoundland's exports to Britain. 
In conjunction with the general European dollar shortage, this spelled the loss of 
Newfoundland's traditional European markets for her fish, iron ore, newsprint 
and mining timber. As early as September 1949, "thousands" of loggers in 
Central Newfoundland found themselves out of work. These were joined by 
fishermen who, because of the poor fishing season, had been looking for 
alternative woods work. In October 1949, 600 Newfoundlanders were laid off at 
the American bases in the province.31 In February 1950, Bell Island's population 
of 10,000 was faced with severe depression as the British, who had been buying 
half of the local iron ore, failed to place a new order; overnight, Bell Island 
slipped from being a prosperous industrial centre to a community with no 
future. There was a widespread feeling that "it had not been as bad since the last 
depression".32 
For Newfoundland's saltfish industry, the marketing crisis of 1949-1950 
marked the beginning of the end. "The devaluation of September 1949", wrote 
Raymond Gushue, chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, "may be 
characterized as the heaviest single adverse blow ever felt by the fisheries of this 
country or province".33 David Alexander attributed the rapid decline of the 
fisheries thereafter to the federal government's complete disregard for this 
resource, and in particular to the neglect of market development and marketing 
organization.34 Smallwood, however, who during his term in office ended up 
putting far more money and effort into revitalizing the fisheries than into 
industrial development,35 was not afraid to blame the producers themselves for 
28 Daily News, 13 January 1950. 
29 Newfoundland Journal of Commerce, XXII, 8 (August 1955), p. 7. 
30 Evening Telegram, 13 October 1949. 
31 Evening Telegram, 20 September, 5 October 1949. 
32 Evening Telegram, 6 February 1950. 
33 Newfoundland Journal of Commerce, XVIII, 1 (January 1951), p. 69. 
34 David Alexander, The Decay of Trade: An Economic History of the Newfoundland Saltfish 
Trade, 1935-1965 (St. John's, 1977). 
35 Rowe, The Smallwood Era, pp. 42-8, cites Ralph Matthews, Peter Neary and Parzival Copes in 
support of his contention that in the Smalllwood era "nothing received so much attention as did 
the Newfoundland fisheries". From 1951-1966 fish plants alone received a total of $19 million in 
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the loss of their markets and the "dire peril" of the fisheries in 1949-1950. In his 
1950 New Year message he identified serious defects that could not be remedied 
overnight: 
It is the peril of trying to carry on our fishing industry as our fathers and 
our grandfathers did. It just cannot be done. The fishing industry will fall 
on terrible times, and the fishermen will fall on terrible times if we do not 
change, if we do not develop. We should be the most energetic, progres-
sive, up-to-date fishing country in the world. Instead we are the most 
slothful, the most unprogressive, and the most backward fishing country in 
the northern half of the globe...I am talking about our methods of produc-
ing fish, our boats and vessels, our fishing gear, our fishing premises.36 
Among the reactions of Newfoundlanders to these economic difficulties, two 
are noteworthy in the context of this analysis. There appeared to be a substantial 
increase in mass migrations to other parts of Canada in search of jobs and a 
growing demand, across the dividing lines of political and economic interest, for 
new economic development. "It was this situation", Albert Perlin recalled in 
1958, "that sparked the vigorous drive to diversify the economy through govern-
ment financing of secondary industries".37 
No statistics are available about the exodus of Newfoundlanders,38 but some 
indication of the nature of the movement can be obtained from contemporary 
observations. The anti-Confederates, of course, had contended all along that 
Newfoundland would be denuded of its population in the event she joined 
Canada. They had charged that in 1948 a lot of people had voted for a "suit-case 
government", i.e. a constitutional setup that would allow them to move freely to 
Canada.39 By mid-November 1949, it was reported in The Evening Telegram 
that "many hundreds of Newfoundlanders had moved out of the Province, if 
reports from railwaymen and others are to be believed". The exodus of New-
loans, which is far more than the total spent on new industries during that 
time and does not include "the significantly large amounts" in loans granted to 1,700 individual 
fishermen. According to Rowe, "largely because of pressure from the Newfoundland govern-
ment, Ottawa spent $110 million directly on the Newfoundland fisheries and, indirectly, another 
$200 million for a total of over $300 million". 
36 Daily News, 3 January 1950. 
37 The Newfoundland Story (Halifax, 1958), pp. 7 ff. 
38 Kari Levitt, Population Movements in the Atlantic Provinces (Halifax and Fredericton, 1960) 
and Ralph Matthews, "The Smallwood Legacy", p. 97, arrive at the following estimates for net 
migration of Newfoundland's population (in thousands): 
1935-1945 1945-1951 1951-1956 
Levitt -15.6 -11.9 + 1 . 9 
Matthews -15.6 -15.0 +35.0 
39 F.G. Hollohan, Albert Perlin: A Biography (St. John's, 1985), pp. 64 ff.; Daily News, 22 May 
1950. 
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foundlanders, most of them carrying one-way tickets for Toronto, was 
apparently observed on the train connecting with the gulf boat. Starting in 
March 1950, Bell Island miners were reported departing for jobs in Ontario 
mines.40 By June 1950 the federal Department of Labour was arranging for a 
systematic transfer of unemployed Newfoundlanders to farms, track work, 
mines and other jobs in Ontario.41 In May 1950, the Newfoundland Board of 
Trade Council became so concerned about the reports of "almost wholesale 
migration from Newfoundland" of people who were characterized as "the most 
ambitious and the most industrious", that it asked for a statistical check on this 
movement. They were the kind of people, The Daily News commented, "that no 
country can afford to lose in large numbers without a progressive impairment of 
its economic prospects".42 
In the provincial legislature, the five members of the Opposition did not 
outline any alternatives to the strategy of economic development put forth by 
Smallwood. Opposition member R.J. Fahey agreed "that industrial develop-
ment is a good thing" and his colleague F.D. Fogwill even endorsed the Pre-
mier's dictum that "we must develop or perish".43 In March 1950, the retiring 
president of the Newfoundland Board of Trade, L.M. Ayre, called on New-
foundland businessmen not to underestimate the possibilities for further devel-
opment, but instead to embarrass the government with the number of proposals 
for Newfoundland's betterment. "To hold our population we must develop", he 
stated. And the president-elect, George G. Crosbie, stressed the need of obtain-
ing local or outside capital to bring about full and gainful employment as "the 
only means by which Newfoundland can be self-supporting and provide a higher 
standard of living for all of our people".44 With increasing impatience the two 
daily papers in St. John's demanded industrial development. On 27 January 
1950, The Daily News commended Smallwood, controversial as he might be, on 
the enthusiasm with which he was tackling the overdue job of industrial develop-
ment, while "a blueprint of projects aimed at making unemployment nothing 
more than a spectre of the past" was awaited by The Evening Telegram "with 
intense interest". By 2 June 1950, The Daily News was chiding the government 
for not implementing its pre-election promises of industrial development: "This 
is the Government's most severe test. It is a test it must accept...Now the 
demand is for action and the need was never more urgent". At the same time the 
usually detached and critical editor of The Evening Telegram was clamourig 
that "this island has been crying for development for decades now. The day is 
past when 30,000 people can live off one branch of the fisheries. Regardless of 
40 Evening Telegram, 16 November 1949, 5 and 25 March, 10 May 1950. 
41 Evening Telegram, 3 and 16 June 1950, Daily News, 6 June 1950. 
42 Daily News, 22 May 1950. 
43 Assembly Proceedings, 6 December 1949. 
44 Ayre continued: "With the Premier present, I hesitate to say develop or perish, I might be 
accused of plagiarism": Newfoundland Journal of Commerce, XVII, 3 (March 1950), pp. 15-16, 
20 ff. 
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sentiment, the salt cod industry is on its way out...there is no better use for the 
surplus than to spend it on development".45 
Economic development was Smallwood's top priority from his first day in 
office. Imbued with the faith in the viability of strategies for developing the 
economies of so-called underdeveloped countries that was characteristic of his 
era, he declared for the first time on 28 July 1949 in the legislature that "New-
foundland must develop or perish; we cannot stand still". Later he defined his 
economic strategy as "an offensive against underdevelopment".46 Among the 
prevailing assumptions of such development strategies was the need to borrow 
the latest technology and apply the most efficient techniques, for government to 
play a prominent role as the driving force and propagator of a strong faith in an 
industrialized future, and for a fiscal regime characterized by "daring and gener-
osity instead of parsimony". Industrialization was expected to be rapid.47 The 
creation of a new Department of Economic Development headed by Smallwood 
himself, as one of the first acts of the new provincial government, was an indica-
tion of his commitment. The department was to be small, compact and highly 
efficient. According to the act authorizing its establishment, this department 
had the power to encourage and coordinate as well as to assist and guide econo-
mic development. Its initial task would be to undertake an overdue economic 
survey of the province's resources as a prerequiste for industrial development. 
That was expected to take one year or more. Smallwood had the choice of 
biding his time or searching for "possibilities that needn't wait for the 
surveys".47 
When the first session of the new House of Assembly opened in July 1949, the 
Speech from the Throne contained no reference to any specific development 
project or new secondary industry. In September 1949, Newfoundlanders re-
ceived a first glimpse of Smallwood's visions when, after examining Newfound-
land seal skins at Bowring's exhibit at an Industrial and Trade Fair in St. 
John's, he wondered: "How long are we going to be content to send raw, un-
tanned, unprocessed sealskins out of Newfoundland to bring prosperity to other 
parts of the world?" He indicated that next year the Fair's display would be en-
riched: "There will be products which have been manufactured for the first time 
in this country".49 Discussions with Bowring Brothers Ltd. revealed that the 
establishment of a sealskin tannery in St. John's could be a successful venture 
only if a reasonable market for its products was found on the Canadian main-
land. "In the meantime we must be satisfied with tanning in the United King-
dom", wrote the director of the firm to Smallwood, "as we can be certain of 
45 Daily News, 27 January, 2 June 1950; Evening Telegram, 30 May 1950. 
46 Assembly Proceedings, 30 March 1950. 
47 See Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas (Chicago, 1952), pp. 3-29, 252. 
As a professional journalist and radio broadcaster, and as a result of his search for advice from 
American development agencies, Smallwood appeared quite familiar with this thinking. 
48 Smallwood, I Chose Canada, p. 345. 
49 Evening Telegram, 13 September 1949. 
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maintaining our quality which is essential when filling any orders we may 
obtain".50 
When in the fall of 1949 unemployment rose to 10 per cent of the population 
and one-third of the unemployed turned out to be ineligible for unemployment 
insurance, Smallwood instituted a temporary public works scheme for 9,000 
men. The $3.4 million it cost, as well as the $3 million deficit of the first provin-
cial budget which was tabled six weeks later, were to come out of the province's 
surplus account of $45 million. Smallwood gave notice, however, that only new 
or expanded industrial development would solve the problem of unemployment 
and destitution "with any degree of reality or permanency".51 At the same time 
he announced the intention to use part of the surplus for development purposes 
before this money was dissipated without having made any basic change in the 
province's overall economy. Thus an Industrial Development Loan Fund and a 
Board modelled on the federal government's Industrial Development Bank were 
created in October 1949 which offered loans of up to "fifty thousand dollars, or 
maybe more" for enterprises with which the ordinary chartered bank was not 
permitted to deal.52 As the economic crisis deepened, Smallwood commissioned 
surveys and reports from a number of agencies about development 
possibilities.53 He has "a great sense of urgency", recorded one of his economic 
development consultants in February 1950, and "grudges every week that passes 
without constructive action".54 To the public Smallwood confessed repeatedly 
"that no government in Newfoundland's history ever worked any harder than 
we are doing".55 
To Smallwood's disappointment, all of his consultants advised further re-
search. None of them came up with new data or concrete proposals. "The 
amount of money involved is too great to risk waste through haste", cabled the 
president of the International Basic Economy Corporation in New York in 
March 1950 in reply to Smallwood's pleas that at least a survey of Newfound-
land's hydro-power potential be completed by 1950.56 Nor did the creation of the 
50 J.C. Grieve to J.R. Smallwood, 11 April 1950, "New Industries", Box 15, Smallwood Collec-
tion. 
51 Assembly Proceedings, 17 October 1949. 
52 Assembly Proceedings, 23 October 1949. 
53 Among the agencies presenting or preparing reports between May 1949 and May 1950 were the 
following: 1. "A Submission Containing an Outline for Industrial Development", 
by James A. Gibbs, K.C., 2. "Report of the Commission on Research and Development", by 
R.W. Boyle, 3. "CNR Industrial Survey", headed by F.W. Fairweather, 4. "Industrial 
Survey of the Resources of the Province of Newfoundland", by the Newfoundland Industrial 
Development Board, 5. Preliminary Report, by Richardson Wood and Company New York, 
Economic Development of Cities and Regions, 6. "Economic Survey" by IBEC, Technical 
Services Corporation, New York, 7. "Survey of Newfoundland's hydro potential", by Power 
Corporation of Canada. See "Economic Development", Box 101, Smallwood Collection. 
54 Richardson Wood to Stacey May, 9 February 1950, IBEC, 3.08.336, Smallwood Collection. 
55 Daily News, 3 January 1950. 
56 W.K. Harrison to J.R. Smallwood, 22 March 1950, IBEC, 3.08.336, Smallwood Collection; 
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Industrial Development Loan Fund attract any industrial developers. By August 
1950, no loans had been finalized because enquiries consisted of requests "to pay 
off household debts, purchase motor cars, trucks and other mobile equipment, 
finance tourist cabins, build homes, import goods, provide operating capital for 
paying wages, etc.", or because local applicants had no proper legal title to 
property they offered as a security.57 Loan applications to the Treasury for the 
purpose of economic development came mostly from Newfoundlanders who had 
no money of their own to invest.58 
Even more disappointing was the lack of interest shown by Canadian, Ameri-
can and British industrialists in risking investments in Newewfoundland.59 
Smallwood revealed to the House in March 1950 that he had been dealing with 
the biggest names in the world of North American business, investment banking 
and industrial development, starting with Nelson Rockefeller and his Inter-
national Basic Economy Corporation, and Sir William Stephenson, head of 
World Enterprises, Inc.60 Yet as the first anniversary of Confederation ap-
proached, Smallwood did not even have the completion of the surveys of the 
province's resources to show for his offensive on underdevelopment. 
Since he could not "grab a man by the throat and compel him to invest his 
capital and start a new industry", Smallwood was beginning to ponder different 
avenues. Temperament, conviction and circumstance compelled him to consider 
taking greater risks: "People are not going to wait forever for this development; 
if we don't give it to them tomorrow they...go where jobs are, you cannot blame 
them. Our job is to back them, go right out, boots and all, make or break. Here, 
what I mean by 'make or break', here is gamble".61 While it was not clear what 
gamble Smallwood had in mind, his propaganda campaign had come into its 
own. A systematic public relations effort had been an integral part of his devel-
opment strategy from the beginning, and the Department of Economic Develop-
ment was also designed as a propaganda machine.62 Every opportunity was 
seized to dispel apprehensions "that the future here was dull or uninspiring, or 
that this was a place to leave, or that this was a sinking ship". Smallwood "never 
lost a chance to speak of the coming glory of Newfoundland". Commenting on 
the economic outlook for 1950, Smallwood told the British United Press that "if 
half of our hopes are fulfilled, I anticipate that Newfoundland will need to 
Evening Telegram, 18 March 1950. 
57 "Third Annual Report of the Industrial Development Loan Board of Newfoundland For the 
Period Ended March 31, 1953", 3.11.082, Smallwood Collection. 
58 Assembly Proceedings, 2 May 1950. 
59 Smallwood, I Chose Canada, p. 346, Evening Telegram, 3 January 1950. On the lacking interest 
of Canadian corporations in Canadian regional development, see Philip Mathias, Forced 
Growth: Five Studies of Government Involvement in the Development of Canada (Toronto, 
1971), pp. ixff, 11 ff. 
60 Assembly Proceedings, 30 March 1950. 
61 Assembly Proceedings, 17 October 1949, 30 March 1950. 
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increase her population".63 
Readily admitting his lack of training and experience in economics and busi-
ness administration, Smallwood sought out expert advice and guidance. It was 
symptomatic of his approach that he had little use for the considerable amount 
of expertise which the Newfoundland Industrial Development Board had 
accumulated in its eight-year history.64 But Albert Perlin, a high school friend, 
co-editor of The Daily News and a member of this board, was sympathetic to 
Smallwood's dilemma. He agreed that "we have to start almost from scratch 
and we are all impatient to see new industries come into being at once". Perlin 
reinforced Smallwood's conviction that the only means to attain industries was 
through key organization and the right personnel. "First get the right man as 
technical director of the whole development operation" was Perlin's advice in 
November 1949. That man should be "young enough to have plenty of drive" 
and "imaginative enough to see the woods as well as the trees". Perlin admitted 
such a man would not be easy to find and suggested that he be hired for a year or 
two from a top-notch industrial engineering firm with experience in rehabilitat-
ing the economies of underdeveloped countries.65 
Smallwood discussed Perlin's ideas with C D . Howe, Minister of Trade and 
Commerce, in Ottawa in late 1949. Howe agreed to help search for a man with 
the appropriate qualifications.66 Hoping to find a well known administrator or 
business leader for the job, Smallwood approached Donald Nelson, chairman of 
the United States War Production Board, and the British entrepreneur George 
Cadbury. Both turned him down. Smallwood found that leading Newfoundland 
into Confederation seemed nothing compared to the challenge of convincing 
"hard, hardened businessmen, men who have money and don't want to part with 
it easily".67 Smallwood was still groping for results when in May 1950 C D . 
Howe recommended Alfred A. Valdmanis as a person who might suit the re-
quirements of the position outlined by Albert Perlin. Smallwood met Valdmanis 
during a trip to Ottawa on 10 May 1950 and hired him on the spot as Newfound-
land's Director General of Economic Development. His duties were to begin on 
23 May 1950.68 
Valdmanis' credentials for his new job included an accumulation of theor-
etical and practical expertise in "modernization and industrial development of 
under-developed countries" from his days as a legal counsel and then under-
secretary to the Latvian Department of Finance after 1932, and as Latvia's Min-
63 Daily News, 19 January 1950; Smallwood, I Chose Canada, p. 342; Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 141. 
64 Industrial Survey of the Resources of the Province of Newfoundland, prepared by Donald Ross 
& Company, Montreal, for the Newfoundland Industrial Development Board, 1950, CNS. 
65 A. Perlin to J.R. Smallwood, 10 November 1949, "Economic Development", Box 101, Small-
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66 Daily News, 24 September 1969. 
67 Smallwood, I Chose Canada, p. 346; Assembly Proceedings, 30 March 1950. 
68 Daily News, 24 September 1969; J.R. Smallwood to C D . Howe, 22 March 1951, "North Star 
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ister of Trade, Finance and Industry from 1938 to 1939. During this period he 
appears to have been honoured and decorated for establishing "a large number 
of new industries and reorganizing old ones".69 Valdmanis had participated in 
the ambitious and successful efforts of Latvia to diversify her traditional agricul-
turally oriented economy by borrowing and further developing high technology 
in a few select industries, thereby bolstering the newly won political independ-
ence with a measure of economic independence. In the two decades of her in-
dependence from Russia, Latvia managed to emerge as a leading innovator in 
such areas as photographic technology and electronics, fish canning, sugar refin-
ing, gypsum production and the development of new building materials. Grow-
ing up as a member of the first generation of a specially trained and highly 
skilled elite that was to form the foundation of Latvia's continued industrial pro-
gress, Valdmanis became Europe's youngest finance minister at the age of 29.™ 
As a refugee consultant to the British and American forces in Germany and as 
an officer of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in Geneva from 
1945-1948, Valdmanis became a close friend of Hugh Keenleyside, Canada's 
High Commissioner to Newfoundland in 1944 and after the war Deputy Minister 
of Mines and Resources in charge of Canadian immigration. Keenleyside may 
have been instrumental in nominating Valdmanis for the Lady Davis Founda-
tion fellowship that brought him to Canada in 1948 and for inviting him to serve 
as an advisor to his department.71 
Of more immediate relevance to Smallwood were Valdmanis' prewar con-
tacts with industrial circles in Germany and his interests and involvement in 
gypsum and cement production. His knowledge of this field may be traced to his 
assignment in western Germany as a senior economist responsible for planning 
the production of cement, limestone and gypsum during the last year of the war. 
Also, as an IRO officer after the war, his job was to assist Latvian refugees in re-
establishing themselves in western countries. It was probably with his help that 
Friedrich Kreyser, the foremost cement industrialist in prewar Latvia, Kreyser's 
former assistant general manager Max Braun-Wogau, and Ernst Leja, director 
of Latvia's state-owned gypsum industry in Riga from 1937 to 1940, were given 
the opportunity to rebuild the gypsum industry in British-occupied Germany in 
the late 1940s.72 Their industrial success was due not only to the construction 
boom in war-ravaged Germany, but also to a new energy- and labour-saving 
pneumatic calcining technology which Leja's team had developed as early as 
1936 in Latvia. From early 1950 on, Kreyser was looking for ways to export this 
technology together with entire gypsum and cement plants. In April 1950 
Kreyser launched for this purpose a new firm called "Neue Technik GmbH, 
69 Statement of defence counsel Gordon F. Higgins, The Queen vs. Valdmanis, Records of the 
Supreme Court of Newfoundland, No. 533/1954, St. John's. 
70 Vito Vitauts Simanis, ed., Latvia (St. Charles, 111., 1984), pp. 133 ff. 156. 
71 Assembly Proceedings, 24 October 1951, 29 March 1955. 
72 Assembly Proceedings, 24 March 1953; E. Leja to B.J. Bachand, 18 January 1950, "Nova Scotia 
Research Foundation", Box 129, Smallwood Collection. 
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Consulting Engineers". Simultaneously Leja and his Latvian team of techni-
cians were looking for ways to emigrate from Germany, if possible with the help 
of Valdmanis in Canada, "since we are not Germans and Germany is not our 
native country". Their idea was to help build up Canada's gypsum industry in 
cooperation with Kreyser's firm in Germany.73 
The invitation to Valdmanis to come to Newfoundland as Director General of 
Economic Development was extended at a moment when he was as worried 
about his personal career as Smallwood was about the future of his province. At 
the request of the Nova Scotia Research Foundation, since the summer of 1949, 
Valdmanis had been preparing and revising proposals for the establishment of 
gypsum and cement industries in Nova Scotia, to be 50 per cent government-
owned. He was hoping that the implementation of this project would put Krey-
ser in business overseas, enable Leja and his team to emigrate to Canada and 
leave him with a position on the board of directors at a salary of $15,000. A day 
or two before his first interview with Smallwood, Valdmanis learned that his 
final gypsum proposal for Nova Scotia had been turned down by the prospective 
private investors. He considered this a heavy blow to his fortunes in the new 
world. From Germany, Kreyser and Leja greeted news of the Newfoundland 
offer, but warned Valdmanis that, regardless of what he decided to tackle as his 
first project in Newfoundland, it must be one which could be carried out quickly 
and successfully, and be seen and understood by the government and the popula-
tion as beneficial to the economy. 'It must not be a washout",74 he was warned: 
"The new tasks may become the beginning of a great career for you, if you are 
able to solve them successfully. A failure, however, will block your way for a 
long time to come".75 
Based on his Nova Scotia experience, Valdmanis decided to make his inaug-
uration in Newfoundland with a cement plant of a 100,000 tons capacity. He 
argued that, from the standpoint of raw materials and markets, Corner Brook 
provided a better site than Sydney, N.S. Sydney would have to import Portland 
cement clinker to mix with the slag from its steel mills for the production of slag 
cement. The gypsum, limestone and shale deposits of Corner Brook, on the 
other hand, formed "an almost ready made mixture of the right type for roast-
ing Portland cement". He pointed to the serious shortage of 400,000 tons of 
cement in Canada in 1949 and to the fact that, of Canada's eight cement plants, 
none was in the Atlantic Provinces. He figured that 50 per cent of production 
would be consumed in Newfoundland. Apart from employment and profits, a 
cement factory would provide Newfoundland with the basic materials for 
further large-scale developments. As his strongest drawing card, however, he 
played up his connections with Kreyser and Leja. Through them Newfoundland 
73 Ibid.; F. Kreyser to A.A. Valdmanis, 23 May 1950, "Neue Technik", Box 134, Smallwood 
Collection. 
74 Valdmanis to R.D. Howland, 18 March 1950 and Leja to Valdmanis, 18 May 1950, "Nova 
Scotia Research Foundation (Dr. Howland)", Box 129, Smallwood Collection. 
75 Kreyser to Valdmanis, 23 May 1950, "Neue Technik", Box 134, Smallwood Collection. 
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would get a cement mill on better terms, at a lower price and in half the time 
than available anywhere else in North America.76 Expecting to benefit from 
Valdmanis' work in Newfoundland, Kreyser assured him of all the experts and 
contacts he needed. Leja, designated to become chief engineer on his arrival in 
late June 1950, planned to "work out not only a specific project, such as a 
cement plant, but also some kind of a general plan for the future".77 
Smallwood was sold on this idea of a cement plant from the moment he first 
met Valdmanis. It would mean the long-awaited start in the drive for new 
industries. For two months, inconclusive attempts were made to raise money for 
the project through the same investment brokers and groups of financiers in 
New York who had turned down the Nova Scotia project. When the prospective 
investors demanded to undertake their own independent market studies, Small-
wood and Valdmanis were in no mood to wait any longer, especially as the 
demand for cement increased rapidly with the outbreak of the Korean War in 
June 1950.78 The decision to start construction entirely with public funds was 
announced on 2 August 1950. Assuming that the finished plant could be sold 
without difficulty, Valdmanis boasted to Smallwood that he had gone "straight 
out for results" instead of doing "what all so-called 'advisors' do: sit down and 
study...for a year".79 
It did not take Valdmanis long to convince Smallwod of the desirability of a 
gypsum industry on the same terms. By July 1950, the prospects for a new 
gypsum plant in Nova Scotia had suddenly improved.80 Valdmanis' earlier 
market studies had left little doubt that there would be room for no more than 
one gypsum products industry in the Atlantic Provinces and either Newfound-
land or Nova Scotia would have it. Nova Scotia had earlier hesitated to go 
ahead with the project because estimates submitted by the American-owned 
gypsum syndicate in Canada had suggested that, instead of Valdmanis' calcula-
tion of $1.5 million, a capital investment far in excess of $3 million would be re-
quired. These "American figures", Valdmanis pointed out to Smallwood, were 
correct only if the routine "American way" was chosen: "piecemeal" deals, 
placing orders here and there; nobody responsible for the different machinery 
pieces "clicking as a unit"; nobody responsible for strict times of delivery and 
for building and erection within a stipulated period: "There are many industries 
76 "Report on the Proposal in Relation to the Establishment of a Portland Cement Factory in 
Newfoundland" (July 1959), "North Star Cement Plant", Box 101, Smallwood Collection; 
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which cannot succeed in Newfoundland if the 'normal' (American) price is to be 
paid for their establishment; but, on the other hand, several new industries will 
survive and become a success in this country, if we can build them at say, 70 per 
cent of the'normal' cost, and if we can secure the necessary specialists presently 
so badly lacking not only in Newfoundland, but in all Maritime provinces".81 
The cabinet approved the project on 9 September 1950. Through Kreyser's 
contacts and Valdmanis' tough bargaining in St. John's with the representatives 
of the German machinery manufacturers Newfoundland obtained such low 
tenders on its cement and gypsum plants ($3 and $2 million respectively) that it 
was alleged the German suppliers actually lost money on these deals. "The fact 
of the matter is we were half ashamed at what Dr. Valdmanis and Mr. Ernst 
Leja screwed the price down to", Smallwood stated in the House on 16 March 
1951. The firms of MI AG and Benno Schilde signed the contracts mainly be-
cause they were led to believe that more business would follow. Leja became 
supervising engineer and then general manager of both plants.82 
Valdmanis had nothing to do with the initiation of a third all-government-
funded project, a birch products or hardwoods industry, in the fall of 1950. It 
was entirely the idea of local building contractor Chester Dawe who became 
president of the government-owned Newfoundland Hardwoods Ltd. from 1951 
to 1954.83 However, construction of the cement and gypsum plants as the heralds 
of more industries to come increased Smallwood's dependence on Valdmanis. 
Valdmanis' request in mid-December 1950 for a raise in his salary from $10,000 
to $25,000, effective 1 January 1951, set the stage. Smallwood, then earning 
$7,000 as premier, granted the request without any reservations. "I admired him 
immensely for his seemingly unlimited skills and accomplishments and his 
capacity for hard work", Smallwood recalled.84 Valdmanis' idiosyncracies in 
character, manners and cultural habits did not bother Smallwood as they did his 
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cabinet colleagues and the higher civil service.85 By his own admission Vald-
manis had been granted "nearly absolute authority in matters of economic 
development in Newfoundland" from the day he took office. In order to be able 
to work independently from the not always cooperative civil service, Valdmanis 
also demanded an enlarged, highly qualified personal staff of his own. This staff 
was to be selected and appointed, as well as their salaries determined, by him on 
a contract basis. In return Valdmanis pledged to introduce at least 13 new 
industries in 1951 and to eliminate unemployment by 1952 "as the minimum 
programme which I promise to put into effect".86 
The inability to find private interests to take over the new cement and gypsum 
plants led to the adoption of a new approach to financing new development in 
1951. No more industries were to be built entirely from public funds. Instead, in 
February 1951 a new policy specifically geared to the participation of German 
interests was adopted: "It is visualized that German participation might take the 
form of bringing (a) their machinery and (b) their know-how into the new joint 
companies, and such German capital would form a partnership with local (New-
foundland) private capital and/or, if necessary and desired, also Newfoundland 
government capital would participate". In practice this meant that investment 
by private interests would "be matched dollar for dollar by the Newfoundland 
government", as Valdmanis liked to put it.87 The government's contribution 
would consist of loan guarantees or direct loans for a ten-year period at 4½ to 5 
per cent interest equal to the investment of the company or individual setting up 
the industry. The government loan would be secured by a mortgage on the assets 
of the company to be incorporated in Newfoundland. The declared purpose of 
the loans was to enable private companies "outside the dollar area to procure 
the necessary dollars, to pay customs duties, erect a building, install machinery 
and operate the plant for a few months until returns would begin to come in".88 
The search for suitable investors was at first conducted through Valdmanis' 
close acquaintance and mentor Friedrich Kreyser, director general of the con-
sulting engineering firm Neue Technik in Stadtoldendorf, Germany. Kreyser 
mobilized his friends and business contacts in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium 
and Scandinavia. He also appears to have been instrumental in arranging for the 
law firm of Dr. Werner Hinneberg in Hamburg to act as an agency and general 
clearing house in the recruitment of "serious and reliable" entrepreneurs and 
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projects.89 Hinneberg was paid a commission for his services by the prospective 
investors in Germany and it appears that he occasionally relied on sub-agents to 
whom he paid a finder's fee. Whenever Hinnenberg or Kreyser had lined up a 
number of interested parties, Valdmanis would travel to Germany to size up the 
projects. There he would, if possible, sign a gentleman's agreement to be re-
viewed and confirmed after his return to St. John's. From prospective investors 
Valdmanis' office would require detailed information about the type and value 
of machinery to be imported, the capacity and size of the proposed plant, its re-
quirements of water, fuel, electric power and raw materials, its output and pro-
duction costs and the anticipated markets. Based on this information, Vald-
manis' staff of six — one assistant director, one researcher, one engineer, one 
special assistant, one private secretary and one typist — would prepare a com-
prehensive report for cabinet and legislative approval. 
Smallwood admitted in 1952 that without the financial inducements "we 
could not have persuaded one company to come here". Yet, even with these in-
ducements the initial difficulties of getting sound and serious investment propo-
sitions from Germany seemed insurmountable. The first obstacle proved to be a 
complete ignorance in Central Europe of general conditions in Newfoundland. 
If the average European had any impressions at all, it was of a place blessed with 
eternal fog, rain, snow and ice, not very inviting for settlement and "possibly the 
last spot in the new world that would be chosen if it became a matter of free 
choice".90 To overcome such apprehensions, Hinneberg kept proposing unsuc-
cessfully a formal association among prospective investors for the purpose of 
equalizing the risks and for mutual insurance.91 As late as May 1952 Switzer-
land's leading financial newspaper tried to assure its German readers that Vald-
manis' presence "guaranteed to a European that he is in a country of friends".92 
Prohibitions against Germans investing abroad and purchasing dollars, which 
resulted from currency exchange controls in West Germany, created a different 
set of impediments. These were an extension of the total controls that had been 
imposed by the Allied powers on all sectors of the postwar German economy 
until 1948. Decontrol was gradual, however, due to reparations demands and the 
dismantling of German industries until 1951. Furthermore, the infusion of 
American loans and assistance into the postwar European economy, as well as 
the disruption of world trade, had caused an enormous dollar gap in West 
Germany's trade after 1949. To redress that imbalance, German exports to the 
89 Hinneberg to Valdmanis, 13 March 1951, "Official Confidential Correspondence and 
Semi-Official Personal Correspondence", Box 129, Smallwood Collection. 
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dollar market were officially promoted while German capital investments in the 
dollar area were virtually prohibited. Authority over currency exchange and 
investment abroad was not turned over to the West German government until 
January 1952. Only from then on were German industrialists permitted, though 
not unconditionally, to establish branch plants abroad.93 Because of Small-
wood's policies, Newfoundland was singled out by West Germany's Minister of 
Economics Ludwig Erhardt as one of the most easily accessible areas of the 
dollar market in 1952, deserving the special attention of German business in its 
efforts to restore Germany's overseas economic contacts.94 
The strict enforcement of currency exchange regulations in 1951 not only 
deprived the potential German investor of the liquid capital to start operations 
in any part of the dollar area, but also made it all but impossible to equip 
German-owned plants in Newfoundland with new machinery. In 1951 Germans 
planning to start manufacturing in Newfoundland had to go to great lengths to 
camouflage their intentions of starting a new enterprise abroad. They had to 
declare to the authorities in Germany that they would be taking used machinery 
to Newfoundland, renting it to a Newfoundland firm and rental income would 
be returned to Germany.95 Some German firms tried to get around the restric-
tions by dealing through Swiss business and banking connections. Others were 
hatching even more complicated schemes of circumventing the exchange con-
trols. According to an elaborate plan devised by Hinneberg and Dr. A. Sieg-
heim, a German paper manufacturer and friend of Kreyser, Smallwood was to 
be induced to acquire so-called blocked DM (Deutsche Mark) through Jewish 
agencies. Blocked DM constituted sizeable indemnity payments by the West 
German government to victims of Nazi persecution and could not be converted 
and transferred out of Germany until 1954. They were traded by their recipients 
at discounts of up to 50 per cent. Since among Swiss industrialists the demand 
for such funds was high, it was proposed that the Newfoundland government 
purchase the machinery for its German plants from Swiss manufacturers with 
blocked DM.96 
The growing activity of German investors in Newfoundland in late 1951 and 
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especially in early 1952 was as much a function of their interest in Canada as of 
the relaxation of Germany's investment restrictions. Postwar Canada appealed 
to Germans as the "Switzerland of the new world", "the land of growth", and 
"the land of the future".97 Canada's economic policy in the early 1950s met the 
foreign investor more than half-way in his efforts to enter the Canadian market. 
It encouraged the importation of foreign capital, promoted the manufacture in 
Canada of goods previously imported, and offered defence contracts and 
accelerated depreciation rates for foreign investors on the same basis as for the 
domestic ones.98 Noted Der Bund, a leading Swiss financial newspaper in May 
1952: "Economically and politically Newfoundland is Canada".99 
Smallwood was immensely elated about the possibilities of tapping the 
entrepreneurship, technological skills and know-how of German-speaking 
Central Europe. In 1951, he termed his forays into this new area "fishing in 
troubled waters". As he recalled in 1983: 
We went to Germany because Europe was scared of Soviet Russia. The 
German industrialists were particularly scared. In 1950 I was the first 
public visitor who came to Germany from any country. The leaders of the 
German companies all spoke excellent English...I told them they should 
come to Newfoundland. "I've got an escape hatch for you, get established 
in my part of Canada, start a branch of your company in Newfoundland, 
so you have an escape hatch". It was shrewd on my part, it fitted their 
mood.100 
This approach was not as simple as it appeared. In Germany, as everywhere, 
Smallwood approached the biggest and most respectable names — Krupp, 
Stinnes, Humboldt-Glockner-Deutz, I.G. Farben, Siemens, AEG, Leitz, Volks-
wagen — only to find out that these did not seem to be fearful enough of com-
munism to want an escape hatch in Newfoundland.101 On the other hand, those 
who were most desperate to save their skin in case of another war were not 
always desirable because they lacked capital, represented trades unsuitable for 
Newfoundland or had no intention of staying on the island. It is therefore not 
surprising that the first parties, who in 1951 committed themselves to invest 
their machinery in a new industry in Newfoundland, came as refugees from 
communism. 
Albert Jekste and his Riga Film unit, who had managed to salvage their tech-
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nologically highly advanced sound film equipment from Latvia to Germany in 
1944, were compatriots and, in some instances, even acquaintances of Vald-
manis. On his first visit to Germany in October 1950, Smallwood inspected their 
Hamburg studio and immediately recognized the potential significance of this 
film unit for his development strategy. In Newfoundland they would have an im-
portant role to play by producing documentary films for the government, 
demonstrating the success of Smallwood's economic policies.102 
William Dorn, introduced by Smallwood in Newfoundland as a refugee from 
Czechoslovakia, was recruited by Hinneberg. Dorn, descendant of a long line of 
German tanners, would not only establish the tannery that had been on Small-
wood's agenda since Confederation, but also introduce with one blow two more 
industries to Newfoundland. In conjunction with the tannery he agreed to manu-
facture leather garments and bring with him the Hamburg construction firm 
who proposed to build this and other plants for considerably less money than 
local construction firms. Dorn acquired the machines for the tannery from a 
German firm that had gone out of production.103 
Considerable publicity for Newfoundland as well as many new contacts re-
sulted from Smallwood's second trip to Germany from late August to the end of 
September 1951. Subsequently, seven major German industrial concerns de-
cided to go ahead with the establishment of eight branch plants in Newfound-
land: MIAG of Brunswick with a heavy machinery plant near St. John's; Rawe 
and Co. of Nordhorn with a cotton and textile mill in St. John's; G. Hahlbrock 
of Hamelin with a glove factory in Carbonear; Moser and Sons of Schramberg 
with a chipboard factory in Donovans; L. Grube of Hanover with a rubber plant 
in Holyrood; Hanning and Kahl of Bielefeld with a battery plant in Topsail; and 
the Eckardt Strickwarenfabrik of Vocklabruck, Austria, with a knitting mill in 
Brigus. One of Germany's largest shoe manufacturers, Roland Rieker of Tutt-
lingen was prepared in November 1951 to build a branch plant in St. John's, but 
changed his mind when Valdmanis decided this factory had to be near the new 
tannery in the small town of Harbour Grace, 75 miles from St. John's.'04 
From the end of 1951 until mid-1952, Newfoundland's solicitation of German 
industries developed such momentum, and German response appeared so 
promising, that in November 1951 plans were finalized to add Dr. Herbert 
Kaulbach, a senior German civil servant from the West German Department of 
Economics, and two German assistants to Valdmanis' staff. Also, Max Braun-
Wogau, a vice-president of Kreyser's firm Neue Technik, accepted a position as 
special consultant with the Department of Economic Development.105 At this 
time negotiations were also being conducted with German industrialists about 
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the establishment of a steel mill, a chemical industry, an appliance plant, a flour 
mill, shoe and synthetic leather factories, a glass, ceramics, brick and tile indus-
try, factories for paint, glue and soap, lead manufacturing, a marine oil harden-
ing and guanine industry, a furniture factory, a fish cannery and fish meal plant, 
a fur-dressing and dyeing factory, a bread and biscuit industry, a zipper factory, 
pulp and paper mills and hydro-power stations. In mid-December 1951, a pro-
posal was entertained from a Düsseldorf promoter to open a direct Newfound-
land-Hamburg shipping line, shortening the traditional route via Liverpool and 
Rotterdam, for the purpose of "expanding and deepening the already existent 
Newfoundland-German ties".106 A "Canadian Promoting and Trading Ltd." 
with headquarters in St. John's was to be launched to cultivate the new ties and 
to coordinate the interests of the German and the Newfoundland Govern-
ments.107 German-Newfoundland trade was expected to increase with the steady 
influx of German machinery and settlers, and Smallwood was thinking of an 
annual German festival to improve relations between Germans and Newfound-
landers. He declared that the mutual "advantages of German-Newfoundland 
cooperation are too obvious to require elaboration".108 
Smallwood's objective was to attract as many new industries as possible in the 
shortest possible time. To attain this goal, screening procedures were relaxed, 
negative evidence was disregarded and government assistance was increased. 
MIAG's decision to build a machinery plant near St. John's, for instance, was 
hastened and facilitated by playing up the prospects for defence contracts and by 
dispensing with the usual requirement that the German investor prove the objec-
tives and economics of the proposed operation.109 The extent to which Small-
wood was prepared to gamble became evident in his endeavours to acquire an 
optical industry. Hinneberg had broached the idea in June 1951 after meeting 
two parties interested in Canada — Ernst Leitz, manufacturer of world-famous 
optical instruments, and Dr. Lothar Sennewald, an East German refugee teach-
ing and practicing opthalmology at the University of Saarbrücken. In order to 
attract Leitz, Smallwood offered to lend his firm "any amount of money" they 
might reasonably need. When Leitz decided in favour of Central Canada, Small-
wood, against Valdmanis' advice, awarded a loan of $150,000 to Sennewald 
who, without knowledge of the economics and functioning of the optical in-
dustry, had promised to "make for 70 cents an eyeglass frame which sells whole-
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sale for $2.60 and retail for $8.00 in St. John's". This scheme never got off the 
ground.110 
In an effort to reach agreements with Moser, Hahlbrock and Rieker in De-
cember 1951 for chipboard, glove and shoe factories, drastic deviations were 
made from the strategy adopted in February 1951. Valdmanis requested that 
these proposed industries should receive government assistance to the tune of 62, 
64 and 66 per cent respectively of the total capital investment required. He 
argued that this was made necessary because other Canadian provinces had 
learned from Newfoundland how to attract German industries, and Newfound-
land would now have to compete with Quebec and Ontario: "The traditional 
desire of establishing an industry close to market will detract many interests 
from Newfoundland". Valdmanis warned that Newfoundland would soon have 
to look for industries in countries less eager to establish factories abroad, such 
as England, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and Canada.1" 
From visits to Ottawa in late 1951 and early 1952, Valdmanis came back with 
the impression of a growing suspicion there "that we may handle some things in 
too quick, even a wild manner". He became concerned about allegations that he 
was establishing "an industry a month" and was leading "a steady stream of 
Germans into Newfoundland"."2 The extent of Ottawa's misgivings was dis-
closed on 15 March 1952. In his reply to Smallwood's repeated requests for an 
extension of the premium granted in 1949 to Newfoundland manufacturers 
when bidding on federal contracts, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent contended 
that this measure "was not intended to provide assistance to industrial develop-
ment in Newfoundland of a nature unavailable to other provinces...We feel that 
the time has now come for Newfoundland to participate on the same basis as 
other provinces in any federal assistance"."3 Smallwood's efforts to procure 
defence contracts for his new industries proved equally fruitless. 
Ottawa's refusal to assist Newfoundland's fledgling industrialization 
endeavours at a time when West Germany eased her restrictions on German in-
vestment abroad, when other Canadian provinces began to follow Newfound-
land's example of assisting foreign investors and when Newfoundland's pre-
Confederation reserves had been exhausted, dealt a heavy blow to the new 
industries programme. Smallwood announced on 31 March 1952 that the policy 
of building industries with the help of public funds would not be continued and 
110 Assembly Proceedings, 15 April 1952; "Optical Industry Sennewald", Box 114, Smallwood 
Collection; "Senewald Confidential", Box 129, Smallwood Collection; W.J. Browne, Memoirs: 
Eighty-Seven Years a Newfoundlander, Vol. II (St. John's, 1981), pp. 72-4. 
111 Valdmanis to Smallwood, 8 December 1951, "Consolidated Files Re: Finance", Box 108, 
Smallwood Collection. 
112 Valdmanis to G.D. Mallory, 4 and 14 November 1951, "Department of Defence Production", 
Box 135, Smallwood Collection; Valdmanis memorandum, 10 March 1952, "Official Confiden-
tial Correspondence", Box 129, Smallwood Collection. 
113 L. St. Laurent to Smallwood, 15 March 1952, "General Finance", Box 108, Smallwood 
Collection. 
Smallwood's New Industries 117 
that the government would progressively withdraw from active participation in 
the industrialization drive.114 Further industrial projects were to be entrusted to 
the newly formed Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation, a 90-per cent 
government-owned crown corporation holding development and exploration 
rights over most of the government's undeveloped hydro-power, mineral and 
timber resources. NALCO planned to take over the three government plants 
and, from their sale and the anticipated demand for NALCO shares among 
private American investors, intended to finance new developments.115 
Valdmanis, who was one of the founding directors of NALCO, now talked 
about the need for slowing down the hectic pace of Newfoundland's economic 
development and for consolidating the new industries and the province's finan-
cial position. Some technical defects and unforeseen marketing problems of the 
cement and gypsum plants worried him as much as the inability to sell these 
plants. By the end of June 1952, the "picture looked anything but rosy" to Vald-
manis.116 On 5 February 1953, he asked Smallwood to be relieved from his duties 
as Director General of Economic Development, explaining that "for the con-
solidation period which is now coming, I am not indispensable as full time direc-
tor general".117 Valdmanis continued as chairman of NALCO for another year 
without being able to achieve any of NALCO's objectives. Rapidly losing faith 
in the success of his industrialization drive, he was casting around for a position 
with a private corporation until Smallwood asked for his resignation from 
NALCO, ostensibly for setting up an expensive NALCO office in Montreal and 
other minor irregularities.118 Two months later, Smallwood had Valdmanis 
arrested on charges of having accepted kickbacks, an offence which might have 
been less reprehensible in the context of the time had it not been committed in 
the name of the premier or his party. 
Outside observers, however, found no evidence that a turning point had been 
reached as early as 1952 in Newfoundland's drive for rapid industrialization. 
Most of the new industries were not ready to start production until 1953 and 
1954. In June 1952, C R . Fay, a visiting professor of economic philosophy from 
Cambridge University, regarded "the industrial boom going on in Newfound-
land as one of the most interesting developments in world history today, com-
paring it with Great Britain's industrial revolution of 200 years ago".119 To 
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Harold Horwood, later to be Smallwood's most persistent and biting critic, 
Newfoundland's industrial development, "far from slowing down" in late 1952, 
showed "signs of speeding up and perhaps even reaching landslide proportions 
within the next year or two". As late as the end of March 1953, he defended 
Smallwood against charges of having wasted the province's $46 million surplus. 
Even if the government was only 50 per cent right in spending the money, he 
reasoned, "that fifty per cent has gone into making Newfoundland a more desir-
able place to live, a place in which it is possible to live more successfully".120 
It has been estimated by Herbert Gross that some 20 German industrial 
enterprises had been started in postwar Canada by 1953, with more than half of 
them located in Newfoundland. In 1953, the German economist foresaw prob-
lems for Newfoundland's German industries because of their dependence on far-
away markets, long and costly routes of transportation and an unskilled and un-
reliable labour force. He expected that these drawbacks would in the long run 
outweigh the advantages of low wages, government subsidies, technical effi-
ciency and pioneering enterpreneurship. But, he suggested poignantly, "risks 
like that are an integral part of the general future of the island".121 
The new industries from Germany assumed from the beginning a far more 
modest posture than Smallwood had initially assigned to them. Certain 
psychological and economic constraints rather than new opportunities had 
dictated the choice of secondary industries. Newfoundlanders had experienced a 
revolution of rising expectations which saw land-based industrial development 
as the only way to end Newfoundland's dependence on the unreliable fishery. 
Economically, Smallwood conceived the new industries programme initially as 
a fiscal and socio-economic alternative to the dole, an investment of the pre-
Confederation surplus in a long-term solution to the social and economic dis-
location which accompanied Newfoundland's entry into Confederation. After 
Smallwood had been unable to arouse the serious interest of any Canadian, 
British or American investor or industrial developer in Newfoundland, he relied 
on the efforts of Valdmanis to solicit industries from Germany. By enabling 
German entrepreneurs to overcome the Allied-imposed prohibition on capital 
investment outside Germany, Smallwood triggered an invasion of German pros-
pectors eager to establish a foothold in the North American dollar 
market. Some of them used Newfoundland as a refuge from communism or as a 
way to enter Canada. The sudden, quite unexpected, upsurge of German activity 
in Newfoundland created for about one year the euphoria of a runaway indus-
trial revolution. 
In Newfoundland the new industries had to struggle under conditions that 
their managers and skilled workers had not anticipated in Germany. As Small-
Minister Churchill "showed great interest in the development of Newfoundland and described 
this development project as a model for the development of economies in the whole world". 
120 Evening Telegram, 26 June 1952, 30 March 1953. 
121 Gross, Kanada, pp. 275, 282 ff., 358, 436. 
Smallwood's New Industries 119 
wood told them, they had to "make the best of it".122 Nevertheless, Smallwood 
saw no reason to regret his quest for industries from Germany. In November 
1952, he characterized the significance of the services that Valdmanis had 
rendered Newfoundland in these words: "Only three short years ago Newfound-
land was not heard of and if known, then as a backward, undeveloped island. 
Today she is well known in the circles of industrialists and financiers on both 
sides of the Atlantic".'23 
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